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Showing posts with the label Central Bank Policy Path

Record Gas Storage Faces a January Offtake Rate 45 Percent Above the 2016-17 Winter

The Energy Information Administration's August 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook , released on August 11, puts one number at the centre of this winter's natural gas story. The outlook states that “we expect natural gas inventories to be a record 3,985 billion cubic feet (Bcf) at the end of October 2026,” a figure “which is an increase of 19 Bcf compared with the July STEO and 5% above the five-year average.” Ten years earlier the same commodity produced almost the same reading. On the EIA's weekly Lower 48 working gas series , the last October report of 2016, for the week ending October 28, recorded 3,963 Bcf. The two figures sit 22 Bcf apart, about half a percent. What changed is everything the stock has to be measured against. A stock figure is a numerator. On its own it is a volume, not a condition. This piece takes up a narrow question: when the numerator is flat across a decade and the denominator is not, which denominator should a reader use, and do the pl...

Which Estimate Counts When a 241 Billion Dollar Statistical Discrepancy Separates GDP From GDI

Two Estimates of One Quarter, and a 241 Billion Dollar Gap On August 26, 2026, the Bureau of Economic Analysis published its second estimate of second-quarter output. Real gross domestic product increased at an annual rate of 1.5 percent . Real gross domestic income increased 2.2 percent . The average of the two, which BEA also publishes, increased 1.8 percent . These are not three views of three different things. They are three arithmetic treatments of one quarter. GDP counts what was spent on final output. GDI, in BEA's glossary, is "the costs incurred and the incomes earned in the production of gross domestic product (GDP)" ; BEA's primer on the accounts lists its four components as "compensation of employees," "taxes on production and imports less subsidies," "net operating surplus," and "consumption of fixed capital." In the national accounting framework the two totals are definitionally equal. The difference between...

When a Yield Curve Un-Inverts, the Reason Matters More Than the Sign

A Sign Change Is Not a State Change The spread between the 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields stood at +0.50 percentage points on 20 August 2026 — the 10-year at 4.69%, the 2-year at 4.19%, per the Federal Reserve's H.15 release. That is a normally sloped curve, and every monthly average from August 2025 onward is positive as well. Somewhere between April 2024, when the monthly average sat at −0.33 points , and September 2024, when it printed +0.10 , the sign flipped. The narrative attached to that fact runs like this: the inversion was the warning, the un-inversion is the all-clear, and the recession the inversion advertised either arrived quietly or was called off. The problem with that reading is not that it is optimistic. The problem is that it treats one number as one piece of information. The spread is a difference between two independently traded prices, and two prices moving in opposite directions, or in the same direction at different speeds, can produce identical spr...

Once the Yield Curve Un-Inverted in 2024, the Recession Clock Was Supposed to Start

The two-year and ten-year Treasury spread has not been inverted since the summer of 2024. On a monthly average basis the last negative reading was August 2024, at −0.10 percentage points; September 2024 printed +0.10 and the series has not gone below zero since. On 18 August 2026 it stood at +0.52 percentage points, with the two-year at 4.19 percent on 17 August and the ten-year at 4.68 percent on 14 August. The ten-year against the three-month bill, the spread the New York Fed's own recession model prefers, was +0.85 on 17 August. Almost none of the commentary that followed the 2022–2024 inversion has been revisited in light of that. The inversion was treated as the warning; the return to a positive slope was treated as the all-clear. On the historical record, that sequencing is backwards. In every clean post-1976 episode, the business cycle peak arrived after the spread crossed back above zero, not during the inverted stretch. Twenty-three months have now passed since t...

The Signal That Ended Quantitative Tightening Came From Repo Markets, Not the Portfolio

Balance sheet reduction is usually explained with a mirror. Easing added securities and created reserves; tightening removes securities and extinguishes reserves; the second is the first run backwards. As an accounting identity the framing holds: assets fall, liabilities fall, and duration absorbed by the central bank returns to private portfolios. What the mirror does not survive is contact with how the most recent programme ended. The Federal Open Market Committee announced on 29 October 2025 that it would conclude the reduction of its aggregate securities holdings, effective 1 December 2025. Since June 2022 the portfolio had shrunk by more than $2.2 trillion, roughly $1.6 trillion of Treasuries and about $600 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities. Reserve balances stood at $2.85 trillion on 31 December 2025, per the New York Fed's report on open market operations during 2025. That last figure is where the mirror breaks. The previous runoff stopped in September 2019 wi...